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DeMartini: Survival Statute: Punitive Damages in Survival Actions
CASE COMMENTS
SURVIVAL STATUTE: PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN SURVIVAL
ACTIONS
Fowlkes v. Sinnamon, 97 So.2d 626 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1957),
cert. denied with opinion, 101 So.2d 375 (Fla.1958)
Defendant negligently collided with a taxicab operated by decedent, who died within a few minutes without regaining consciousness. He left no widow, child, or dependent. Plaintiff-administrator
sued to recover damages for wrongful death and for compensatory
and punitive damages under the Survival of Actions Statute. The
trial court granted compensatory damages for wrongful death and
punitive damages in the survival action. On appeal, HELD, assuming,
but expressly not deciding, that punitive damages may be granted in
a survival action, such damages may not be awarded in the absence
of a showing of substantial compensatory damages. Reversed in part.
When the victim of a tort dies, whether as a result of his injuries
or from an unrelated cause,' before prosecuting his claim, his cause
of action survives and may be maintained by his personal representative.2 If the decedent leaves no surviving spouse, child, or dependent,
the personal representative may also sue for the wrongful death of
the decedent. 3 However, the theories and the measure of damages for
the two actions are not the same. Under the survival statute the
action is based on the injury to the decedent, and damages may be
recovered for pain and suffering and medical expenses.4 The action
for wrongful death is for the injury to the decedent's family, and the
measure of damages is the present value of an estate that the decedent
5
might reasonably have been expected to earn and save had he lived.
The court in the instant case assumed, but expressly did not hold,
that punitive damages may be awarded in a survival action. Punitive
damages are not available under the Wrongful Death Act, since
the statute creates a new cause of action and only damages expressly
'Epps v. Railway Express Agency, 40 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1949).
2FLA. STAT. §45.11 (1957): "No action for personal injuries and no other action
shall die with the person, and all actions shall survive and may be instituted,
maintained, prosecuted and defended in the name of the personal representative of
the deceased, or in the name of such other person as may be provided by law."
3FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1957).
4Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213 (1945).
SIbid.; Florida E.C. Ry. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914); see Alpert,
Florida Death Acts, 10 U. FLA. L. Rav. 153 (1957).
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authorized by the statute may be awarded. 6 However, this reasoning
is not applicable to the survival statute because it does not create
a new cause of action; it merely allows the administrator to maintain
8
the decedent's cause of action. As one writer has stated:
"Logically, if the deceased had filed suit claiming punitive
damages and then died, his personal representative should recover the punitive damages that the deceased could have reThe fact that the Survival Act makes
covered had he lived ....
no provision for punitive damages is irrelevant - the suit is not
by dependents for support but by the personal representative,
who is, conceptually, the deceased."
In the instant case the propriety of the damages awarded under
the Wrongful Death Act was not involved on appeal. The question to be determined concerned damages available in the survival
action. Since the decedent died only moments after the accident
occurred and without regaining consciousness, compensatory damages
could be only nominal. 9 Are nominal compensatory damages a sufficient predicate for punitive damages? The court answers in the
negative.
As a general proposition the right to recover punitive damages
exists only when there is a right to compensatory damages.10 However, the courts are not in agreement in the application of this rule.
The majority of jurisdictions allow an award of punitive damages to
be based on an award of nominal damages." A minority require
actual damages as a predicate for punitive damages. 1 2 Within this
6Florida E.C. Ry. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
7Ft.A. STAT. §45.11 (1957).

8Alpert, supra note 5, at 176.
DEnglish v. United States, 204 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1953); Beaven v. Seaboard Air
Line R.R., 100 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Fla. 1951).
1OE.g., McLain v. Pensacola Coach Corp., 152 Fla. 876, 13 So.2d 221 (1943);
Foster v. Sikes, 202 Ga. 122, 42 S.E.2d 441 (1947); Walker v. L. B. Price Mercantile
Co., 203 N.C. 511, 166 S.W. 391 (1932). See also MCCORMicK,

DAMAGES

§83

(1935).

But see Scalise v. National Util. Serv., Inc., 120 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1941).
"E.g., Crystal Dome Oil & Gas Co. v. Savic, 51 Idaho 409, 6 P.2d 155 (1931);
Parris v. H. G. Fischer & Co., 221 N.C. 110, 19 S.E.2d 128 (1942); Cooke v. Atlantic
C.L.R.R., 183 S.C. 279, 190 S.E. 923 (1937). See also 15 AM. JUR., Damages §271
(1938). Although this is the majority view, the definitions of "nominal damages"
are not always uniform.
12See notes 13, 14 infra.
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latter grouping another split occurs: one rule requires that there be
a finding and an award of compensatory damages; 13 the other requires
only that actual damages be pleaded and proved, irrespective of
whether they are awarded. 14
In McLain v. Pensacola Coach Corp. 5 the Florida Supreme Court
indicated its approval of the rule that requires a showing of some
substantial actual or compensatory damages as a prerequisite to an
award of punitive damages. In the instant case the district court of
appeal stated that the Supreme Court's "indicated sanction and application of the rule in that [McLain] case prompts us to apply it
here." 16 In following the dictum in McLain the court fails to follow
the modem tendency to require only nominal damages as a predicate
for punitive damages. Thus the anomaly results that if the wrongdoer's act is severe enough to cause immediate death, as in the instant
case, he is immune to a punitive damages claim. It is submitted that
the right to punitive damages under the survival statute should not
be defeated when the decedent died immediately or was unconscious
during the interval between injury and death. A decedent should not
be required to suffer a "substantial amount's worth" in order for
his estate to be entitled to punitive damages.
Although the injustice of this rule is most apparent in the instant
case, it is equally unjust in other situations. Since punitive damages
are awarded for "malice, moral turpitude, wantonness or for outrageous tort '17 and are in the nature of a penalty, their award should
not depend on whether the tort-feasor was successful in inflicting
substantial damages on his victim. In the case of some torts, for
example, slander, invasion of privacy, and false imprHsonment, it is
difficult to prove actual damages. This should not prevent the award
of punitive damages when the defendant's conduct is reprehensible
enough to warrant the imposition of such damages.
V. MICHAEL DEMARTINI

'SE.g., Kroger Grocery 8: Baking Co. v. Reeves, 210 Ark. 178, 194 S.W.2d 876
(1946); McCain v. Cochran, 153 Miss. 237, 120 So. 823 (1929); Allen v. Melton, 20
Tenn. App. 387, 99 S.W.2d 219 (1936).
14E.g., Burk v. Knott, 20 Ala. App. 316, 101 So. 811 (1924); Claney v. ReidWard Motor Co., 237 Mo. App. 1000, 170 S.W.2d 161 (1943); Adelman v. Rosenbaum, 133 Pa. Super. 386, 3 A.2d 15 (1938).
15152 Fla. 876, 878, 13 So.2d 221, 222 (1943) (dictum).
lBAt 628.

17Glickstein v. Setzer, 78 So.2d 374, 375 (Fla. 1955).
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